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Abstract
International economic theory suggests that people should embrace economic integration because it promises large gains. But policy reversals such as Brexit indicate
a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an experiment of how
size and cross-country distribution of gains from integration inﬂuence individuals’
inclination to cooperate to reap its intended beneﬁts and to embrace or reject integration. The design considers an indeﬁnitely repeated helping game with multiple
equilibria and strategic uncertainty. The data reveal that inequality of potential
gains neither aﬀected behavior nor reduced support for economic integration. However, integration may lead to disappointing, unequally distributed welfare gains,
undermining support for the policy. This suggests that to better assess integration
policies, we should account for the spillover eﬀects of integration on behavior. Miscalculating this behavioral aspect may undermine the intended development goals
and motivate calls for dramatic policy-reversals.
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Introduction

A large body of research asserts that integration of markets generates large
overall gains, due to specialization, increased productivity, expanded product
variety, and pro-competitive gains and innovation (Costinot and Rodrı́guezClare, 2018; Feenstra, 2018; Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). Yet, after decades of increasing economic integration, there are signs of a desire to scale it back. The
backlash in the support of regional and multilateral trade agreements is one
indication. The choice of a majority of the British people in 2016 to exit the
European Union is another. The question is why: what pushes individuals to
limit or scale back economic integration, given that it is costly?1
Here, we use an experiment to study a possible contributing factor: crosscountry inequality of economic opportunity. What motivates this angle of
inquiry are related observations from the trade and experimental literatures.
There is evidence that, though the estimated gains from integration are positive, they are also unevenly distributed (Fort et al., 2018; Hakobyan and
McLaren, 2016); this may reduce support for it (Stiglitz, 2020, p. 288), as
economic inequality can distort decision-making (Cappelen et al., 2014), induce short-sighted conduct (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), and act as a barrier
to cooperation in short-term interactions (Tavoni et al., 2011). Further, the
literature on economic integration recognizes that as local markets are scaled
up trust and enforcement frictions emerge making it necessary to rely on selfenforcing trading arrangements (Rodrik, 2000); but informal norms of cooperation do not easily scale up (Camera et al., 2013a). We thus hypothesize that
cross-country inequality in prospective gains might degrade coordination on co1

Brexit may cost up to 10 percent of UK per capita GDP (Sampson, 2017); Chakraborty et
al. (2017) estimate the cost of ﬁnancial disintegration in Europe at half percent of GDP.
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operative arrangements to the point where actual gains become unattractive,
in which case pursuing an integration policy would undermine its economic
development objectives.2
The experiment is based on an indeﬁnitely-repeated helping game (a supergame) played in consumer-producer pairs with alternating roles. The producer can either cooperate or defect, and is the only decision-maker. By cooperating, she suﬀers a small cost and the consumer obtains a large economic
beneﬁt. We induce heterogeneous cooperation valuations by randomly assigning 24 participants to three types (or, countries) each with a diﬀerent beneﬁt
amount (cross-country inequality of opportunity). During a familiarization
phase, participants interact in ﬁxed pairs with a single counterpart of their
same type—an “isolated” economy. They also interact in mixed groups of 12
strangers where counterparts can be of any type and change at random—an
“integrated” economy. There are potential gains from integration because cooperation beneﬁts are largest—and possibly heterogeneous—in mixed groups
where, however, identities and past behaviors are unobservable. After this
phase, we provisionally form a mixed group with all 24 players, and ask participants to express a preference for staying in it (economic integration), scaling
it down to 16 by excluding a type, or leave it for a ﬁxed pair (isolation). A
majority preference rule determines the economy’s conﬁguration. Based on the
theory of inﬁnitely repeated games, a self-enforcing norm of conduct supports
full cooperation (or, eﬃcient play) in every economy, although many other
equilibria exist.
2

These considerations seem also relevant for smaller-scale integration phenomena. Universities often confront the problem of reorganizing separate (and diﬀerently compensated)
units by merging them into a larger one, which may lack cohesiveness and perform poorly.
Or, consider vertical mergers, when the contribution to value-creation of each ﬁrm is heterogeneous, and corporate settings where personnel from diﬀerent units work in teams.
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The larger size, inability to rely on reciprocity and reputation, and the
lack of explicit coordination devices create signiﬁcant strategic uncertainty in
mixed groups as compared to ﬁxed pairs. This makes explicit a tradeoﬀ between frictions to cooperation and potential gains from integration because
actual gains depend on how strangers behave relative to partners. In pursuing integration, participants must weigh its primary economic eﬀects (greater
cooperation beneﬁts) against its possible secondary behavioral eﬀects (lower
cooperation rate). This is a way to operationalize in the lab the fundamental
problem discussed in Rodrik (2000): in the international trading arena cooperation is highly proﬁtable but not easily attainable because individuals must
be willing—not only able—to cooperate with each other and face additional
frictions that are absent within local borders (e.g., cultural, legal).
To assess the impact of inequality of economic opportunity, we randomly
assign subjects to treatments manipulating the baseline distribution of potential gains from integration. Baseline gains are homogeneous so integration
does not alter pre-existing inequalities. In two treatments, integration either
removes or increases pre-existing inequalities, using mean-preserving spreads
of baseline gains. In a ﬁnal treatment, we increase baseline gains by 70%.
We report four main results. First, participants struggled to capture the
possible beneﬁts of integration. A possible reason is that trust and enforcement frictions undermined subjects’ ability to develop self-enforcing norms of
cooperation (the survey in Bigoni et al., 2020, supports this view). Second,
inequality of economic opportunity does not appear to impair cooperation as
redistributing or increasing potential gains from integration did not improve
cooperation. Third, the size of realized gains played a primary role in the
choice to integrate (not the distribution or size of prospective gains). Fourth,
though everyone could beneﬁt, integration created few “winners” and many
4

“losers,” which induced a negative sentiment toward it. This corroborates the
notion that integration may produce outcomes that diverge from those predicted by standard models owing to frictions that limit individuals’ ability to
realize the gains from trade (see Antràs and Costinot, 2010), and conﬁrms
the classic Stolper-Samuelson Theorem—opening up international trade may
create losers and winners (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). We show that these
results partly depend on strategic uncertainty preventing coordination on cooperation in mixed groups. In a treatment where participants could coordinate
their strategies using a chat box, cooperation in mixed groups signiﬁcantly improved, albeit an aversion to forming large heterogeneous groups remained.
Our experiment can oﬀer insights into whether distributional eﬀects of economic integration agreements should be part of the policy discussion. It allows
us to establish the importance of distributional considerations while minimizing possible confounding factors—political, social and cultural, for instance.
An insight is that researchers and policymakers should weigh the primary
economic eﬀects of economic integration against its secondary behavioral effects. The promised productivity gains (greater cooperation beneﬁts) may be
greatly reduced if integration has adverse spillover eﬀects on cooperative attitudes. Human behavior is not invariant to economic processes and the trading
environment, so miscalculating this secondary eﬀect of integration may lead
to overestimate its potential beneﬁts. In the experiment, the policy of integration undermined economic development and pushed subjects to reject it; this
echoes the message in Dal Bó et al. (2018), where mistaken beliefs about the
behavioral eﬀects of a policy switch induced selection of a policy that, though
theoretically superior, was empirically inferior. Our results contribute to the
growing literature on endogenous institutions for cooperation (see the survey
in Dannenberg and Gallier, 2020), and suggest that to better assess outcomes
5

of integration policies, research and policy should account for possible spillover
eﬀects of integration on behavior, especially those due to cross-country distributional eﬀects. Miscalculating this behavioral aspect might undermine the
intended development and motivate calls for dramatic policy-reversals.

2

Related experimental literature

This study is primarily related to two research themes in the experimental
literature: endogenous group formation and cooperation in repeated games.
Experiments on endogenous group formation typically consider a public goods
game with a ﬁxed number of decision rounds, where theory rules out eﬃcient
play. A main ﬁnding is that if free-riders can be identiﬁed and isolated, then
this promotes the formation of large cooperative groups. Typically this requires institutions for monitoring individual conduct, unilaterally joining or
leaving groups, or sanctioning low contributors, which are either exogenous
(e.g., Ahn et al., 2009; Baland et al., 2017; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Croson
et al., 2015; Güth et al., 2007; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010) or endogenous (.e.g,
Dannenberg et al., 2019; Gürerk et al., 2006). Manipulating the power structure, by choosing to give to someone the freedom to distribute group earnings
also promotes the formation of cooperative groups (Nash et al., 2012). We take
the endogenous institutions angle, but neither assume redistributive powers
nor institutions for self-selection. A collective decision process allows players
to combine pre-existing subgroups into a larger one and random assignment
prevents self-selection.3 Forming a large group opens the door to large gains
3

Our group formation rule randomly lets one subset of players (one type) select group conﬁguration. Initial random assignment to types implies that if participants have heterogeneous
inclinations towards cooperation, then neither choosing “isolation” nor “integration” allows
self-selection into a cooperative coalition. As we are interested in economic integration, this
ensures that, if we think of the three types as countries, individuals cannot leave their coun-
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but magniﬁes the incentives to free ride as participants interact as strangers,
who cannot identify, exclude or prevent free-riders from joining the group.
A way to mitigate free-riding problems is to collectively choose to avoid the
group, giving up potential gains to interact with a ﬁxed partner.
To situate our design in the literature about cooperation in repeated games,
consider two design features: the number of decision rounds (ﬁnite/indeﬁnite)
and the type of interaction (partners/strangers). A ﬁxed number of decision
rounds is common. Here, standard theory predicts ineﬃcient play and, indeed,
empirically cooperation is short-lived (Isaac and Walker, 1988a). Instead,
as we wish to study cooperation as a long-run phenomenon, we work with
an uncertain number of decision rounds, which support eﬃcient play as an
equilibrium. Fixed counterparts (partners) are also common. Instead, as a way
to introduce frictions to impersonal trade, we assume anonymous counterparts
that change at random (strangers).
Our design ﬁts into a broader research agenda about institutions for longrun cooperation in groups of strangers and, in particular, four recent studies.
The two-person stage game, indeﬁnite repetition and random re-matching process follows Camera et al. (2013a), which studies how cooperation reacts to
exogenous variation in group size, when payoﬀs are invariant to group size.
Without a monetary institution in place, cooperation fell as groups got larger.
Unlike our design, players are homogeneous, their roles randomly alternate,
group size is exogenous and does not aﬀect cooperation payoﬀs. Bigoni et
al. (2019) studies endogenous group formation with homogeneous players (vs.
heterogeneous in our design) when cooperation beneﬁts identically increase by
20% in groups of 12 or 24 strangers compared to groups of 2 partners (vs. hettry, or create a new entity comprising arbitrary regions from diﬀerent countries. Countries
can only aggregate into a bigger economic entity, or choose the status quo.
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erogeneous increase by 20%-50%). Without a monetary institution in place,
participants seldom selected groups of strangers and, if they did, performed
poorly. Camera et al. (2020a) studies if fairness and inequality motivations
aﬀect cooperation in ex-ante homogeneous economies with 4 players with randomly changing roles. As the game progresses this causes ex-post earnings
inequality in the group. Participants conditioned cooperation on their own
past realized roles and, when ex-post inequality was made visible, discriminated against those who are better oﬀ. Camera and Hohl (2021) studies social
identity in repeated games, to understand if categorization alone can inﬂuence
norms of cooperation. There are three types of group aﬃliates who either have
diﬀerent cooperation beneﬁts (as we do), or have no payoﬀ-relevant diﬀerences.
Unlike our study—where individuals cannot discriminate between “insiders”
and “outsiders”—cooperation can be conditioned on the counterpart’s group
aﬃliation but not on the behavior of group aﬃliates, so players can adopt
discriminatory strategies but cannot base them on group reputation. Subjects
cooperated similarly with insiders and outsiders.
Unlike the above experiments, we study cooperation among strangers who
face unequal economic prospects, something largely unexplored in the literature
on supergames. Our players are ex-ante heterogeneous in their cooperation
beneﬁts and in how these beneﬁts increase with group size. Standard results
suggest that this heterogeneity should not interfere with coordination on efﬁcient play.4 Our ﬁndings support this theoretical assessment—inequality of
economic prospects did not instigate more opportunism, although it reduced
the desire to form large groups.
4

This means that in all treatments and all groups a strategy always exists that, if adopted
by the entire group, can support the eﬃcient outcome as an equilibrium. According to this
strategy, which is discussed in Section 4, a player should fully cooperate in equilibrium,
and should choose to form mixed groups if given the chance.
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Our study also contributes to an experimental literature about the eﬀect
of heterogeneity on voluntary contributions in public goods games. In some
experiments, heterogeneity is introduced in participants’ endowments (e.g., see
Buckley and Croson, 2006; Chan et al., 1999; De Geest and Kingsley, 2021; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2016; Isaac and Walker, 1988b; Sadrieh and Verbon, 2006),
and its eﬀects on cooperation vary from none to negative. A meta analysis of
linear public good experiments (Zelmer, 2003) reports a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of heterogeneous endowments. In other experiments, participants
have diﬀerent valuations for cooperation. Here, too, heterogeneity has mixed
eﬀects. It does not impact cooperation in Reuben and Riedl (2013), it lowers
unconditional contributions in Fischbacher et al. (2014), and in Kölle (2015)
contributions are lower in groups with heterogeneous vs. homogeneous valuations, with low valuation types contributing less than high-valuation types.
Heterogeneity disrupts cooperative play even when punishment and reward
mechanisms are available (Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Reuben and Riedl, 2009),
and even if players can coordinate via free-form communication (Dekel et al.,
2017; Gangadharan et al., 2017).
These mechanisms lose eﬀectiveness as subjects tend to prioritize equality
over eﬃciency, leading to under-punishment, counter-punishment, or norms
that side-line eﬃciency in favor of redistribution. As in these experiments players interact with few partners whose behavior and type can be observed, reciprocity and the ability to discriminate—which are impossible in our design—
might play a role in how heterogeneity aﬀects cooperation. Our study is also
related to public goods experiments about the trade-oﬀ between equity and
eﬃciency, where heterogeneous players vote on redistribution or contributions
rules (e.g., see Balafoutas et al., 2013; Gallier et al., 2017). Unlike those
studies, we do not study collective choice about redistribution of income, al9

though we do study what happens when subjects can informally coordinate
their strategies using a chat box. Finally, we contribute to expand the use of
experimental methods in international economics, following in the footsteps
of the pioneering market experiment in Noussair et al. (1995) that tested the
competitive trade model, and the social dilemma experiment in Barrett and
Dannenberg (2012) about international collective action.

3

Experimental design

We construct an intertemporal trading game based on Camera et al. (2013a)
and Bigoni et al. (2019), where trust and enforcement problems create incentives for short-sighted conduct. Twenty-four participants are randomly
assigned to three types i = 1, 2, 3 (8 per type) for the entire session. The
experiment has many rounds. In each round subjects interact in pairs, which
may be ﬁxed or randomly changing in every round. This is explained below,
where we discuss the Neutral treatment, which is our baseline.
Interaction in a round. In each round all subjects are in a pair. Each
pair comprises a producer and a consumer. The producer chooses whether to
engage in a transaction (cooperate) or not (defect); the consumer has no action
to take. By defecting, the producer obtains 6 points while the consumer earns 3
(1 point= USD 0.18); see Table 1. By cooperating, the producer earns nothing,
while consumer i earns 9 + 2i + y points, where y depends on whether pairs
are ﬁxed or not (more later). Hence, cooperation creates 2i + y > 0 surplus,
which is entirely earned by the consumer. This payoﬀ matrix is known to all
players. However, the producer cannot observe the consumer’s type, while the
consumer can see the producer’s type.
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This design has two implications. First, since surplus increases in the
consumer’s type i, we say that type 1 is “disadvantaged” relative to others,
while type 3 is “advantaged.”5 Interpreting a type as a country, this implies
cross-country inequality of opportunity due to the 4-point gap in cooperation
payoﬀs between advantaged and disadvantaged consumers.
Table 1: Payoﬀs in a Pair (type i = 1, 2, 3).
Producer’s Choice
Defect
Cooperate
Consumer of type i:
Producer (any type):

3
6

9 + 2i + y
0

Second, for cooperation to be incentive-compatible, producers must have
a prospect of future beneﬁts. This is done by letting participants interact for
at least 18 rounds and with alternating roles (producer, consumer, . . . , and
vice-versa). Participants are informed of this—they know their role and action set switches in every round.6 Starting with round 18, we use a random
stopping rule: a new round is played with probability β = 0.75 using computer randomization (see instructions and post-instruction quiz in Appendix
B). This random sequence has mean duration and standard deviation of 21
(=17+1/0.25) and 3.5 rounds, respectively, and is called a “supergame.”
5

In the experiment types are color-coded (green, red, and blue). A related experiment uses
Neutral data (Phase 1, only) to study if the assignment to types artiﬁcially induces groupidentity that constitutes a psychological basis for intergroup discrimination (see Camera
and Hohl, 2021, footnote 9). No evidence of group eﬀects from the initial categorization
into color-coded types is detected.
6
This is unlike most cooperation experiments, which use a synchronous cooperation task
(e.g., a PD). Our task is asynchronous—a repeated helping game with alternating decisionmakers who experience a time delay between cost of and beneﬁt from cooperation. This
creates a sharper distinction between isolated and integrated economies as it removes strategic uncertainty in ﬁxed pairs (see the discussion in Bigoni et al., 2019). It also emphasizes
the intertemporal nature of cooperation, thus capturing the spirit of the dynamic macroeconomics and trade literature, where the beneﬁts of trade derive from an intertemporal
exchange of goods and services.
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A supergame.

At the start of a supergame, participants are randomly as-

signed to a matching group, or economy. We study two economy conﬁgurations, isolated and integrated. An isolated (autarkic) economy is small, consisting of a ﬁxed pair where players are of the same type and y = 0. An integrated
economy consists of a heterogeneous mixed group with four players per type
(12 in all) and y = 3. Here, in each round players are randomly rematched
with uniform probability and as strangers so that the producer cannot see ID,
type and past actions of the counterpart; hence, cooperation cannot be conditioned on the consumer’s type. At the end of each round players are informed
if their economy attained full cooperation or not.7 As compared to isolated
economies, integrated economies preclude reciprocity and reputation-building
but oﬀer larger cooperation beneﬁts because y = 3 (instead of zero), a value we
refer to as the potential gains from integration. This design captures the key
tradeoﬀ of economic integration that motivates our study: it has the potential
to beneﬁt everyone, but it also induces trust, enforcement and coordination
frictions due to larger size, no reputation building and anonymity.
A session. There are two phases; see Fig. 1. Phase 1 familiarizes participants with isolated economies in supergames 1-2, and integrated in 3-4 (we
also study the reverse order). Matching across supergames is pre-arranged to
minimize spillover eﬀects: participants are informed that they will not meet
counterparts from previous supergames. Phase 1 oﬀers subjects an experiential basis on which they can base their endogenous conﬁguration choices in
Phase 2, which is when they must choose size and composition of the economy
for supergame 5, the last one. Before this supergame starts, participants are
7

This information is anonymized, see the results screen in the instructions in Appendix B,
column “Same Outcome In All Pairs.” We provided it to ensure that the economy size did
not aﬀect the condition for existence of the eﬃcient equilibrium–as discussed in Section 4.
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informed that they are all provisionally included into a 24-player mixed group.
Figure 1: A Session.
Phase 1

ﬁxed pairs

ﬁxed pairs

1

2

Phase 2

12-player
12-player
endogenous
mixed groups mixed groups conﬁguration
3
Supergames

4

5

Notes: Four sessions had Phase 1 as above, and four the reverse order (each treatment).
Our matching process ensured the same consumer-producer pair could not be formed in
diﬀerent supergames except for a mixed group of Phase 2; details are in Supp. Mat.

Then, everyone privately expresses a preference for either (i) maintaining
the provisional conﬁguration (“stay”); (ii) reducing the mixed group to 16
players by matching one type into ﬁxed pairs (“exclude”); or (iii) leaving the
mixed group for a ﬁxed pair (“leave”). After choosing, a computer randomly
selects a player type with equal probability. The majority choice within that
type determines the economy conﬁguration in supergame 5. Two outcomes
are possible: (i) a 24-player mixed group (economic integration) or, (ii) a 16player mixed group comprising two types, and four ﬁxed pairs of the remaining
type.8 The payoﬀ structure is the same as in Phase 1. This selection procedure
is democratic from an ex-ante perspective, as it gives equal weight to each
individual and type.9 The payoﬀ structure ensures that integration is socially
8

Suppose type 1 players are selected to determine the economy conﬁguration. If their
majority chose to exclude type 3, we form a mixed group with types 1 and 2, and four ﬁxed
pairs of type 3. If the majority chose to leave, we form a mixed group with types 2 and 3,
and four ﬁxed pairs of type 1. The computer resolves ties via a coin ﬂip. The instructions
explain that participants would have an opportunity to alter size and composition of the
economy in supergame 5, in a manner speciﬁed at the end of supergame 4. Given the default
assignment to a single mixed group consisting of all 24 session participants, a “leave” choice
can be interpreted choosing economic disintegration.
9
Counting all choices in the session would have been also problematic for two reasons. It
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eﬃcient as it maximizes potential earnings for everyone.
Treatments. Subjects are randomly assigned to four treatments, which differ in just one aspect: the distribution of y in mixed groups (see Table 2),
i.e., the distribution of the potential gains from integration. The value of y is
always zero in ﬁxed pairs of all treatments.
In our baseline, potential gains from integration are identical for everyone,
y = 3 in mixed groups. We call this baseline the Neutral treatment because economic integration increases potential surplus without altering the pre-existing
inequality of economic opportunity: advantaged consumers can always earn
four more points than the disadvantaged (in mixed groups and in ﬁxed pairs).
Table 2: Main Treatments—Cooperation Payoﬀs in Mixed Groups.
Potential Gain
from Integration
(to type 1,2,3)
Neutral
3 3 3
Converge
5 3 1
Diverge
1 3 5
Neutral+
5 5 5

Cooperation
Payoﬀs
(to type 1,2,3)
14 16 18
16 16 16
12 16 20
16 18 20

Potential Inequality of
Surplus Opportunity
baseline
baseline
baseline
increased

baseline
removed
doubled
baseline

Notes: Potential gains from integration corresponds to the value y in mixed groups; this
value is type-dependent in some treatments. The Cooperation Payoﬀ is the cooperation
payoﬀ to a consumer of type i, which is the sum of the payoﬀ in ﬁxed pairs, 9 + 2i, plus the
potential gain from integration, y. Inequality of opportunity is the diﬀerence in cooperation
payoﬀs for consumers of types 3 and 1.

The Converge treatment redistributes potential gains top to bottom without altering potential surplus: y = 5, 3, 1 for type i = 1, 2, 3 in mixed groups.
Here, integration removes inequality of opportunity as cooperation payoﬀs conwould have precluded the possibility of “leaving” ever being the majority choice, and it
would have increased the complexity of determining an outcome (e.g., type 1 wants to
exclude 2, type 2 wants to exclude 3, and 3 wants to exclude 1).
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verge to 16 points for everyone. The opposite Diverge treatment redistributes
potential gains iniquitously, y = 1, 3, 5. Here, integration leads to a greater
divergence of cooperation payoﬀs, 8 points instead of 4 in ﬁxed pairs. Finally,
the Neutral+ treatment boosts y to 5 points for everyone in mixed groups, a
67% increase over the 3-points baseline.
Summing up, the baseline distribution of potential gains from integration
is manipulated either via mean-preserving spreads or by shifting it to the right.
In Converge and Diverge, potential surplus from integration is redistributed to
remove or increase inequality of opportunity. In Neutral+, potential surplus
rises across the board. As the structure of ﬁxed pairs is treatment-invariant,
these isolated economies oﬀer a stable reference point for subjects in evaluating
the performance of integrated economies.
As explained below, all economies exhibit equilibrium multiplicity. This
creates signiﬁcant strategic uncertainty in mixed groups. Previous work suggests this is an obstacle to coordination on cooperation and, consequently, the
formation of large groups (Bigoni et al., 2019). We thus add a ﬁnal treatment,
Neutral-Chat were subjects can explicitly coordinate their actions through a
chat-box, to study if the possibility to overcome strategic uncertainty problems aﬀects the results on group formation.
Experimental procedures. The experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory at Chapman University and involved 864
undergraduates recruited between 2/2017 and 10/2019. Subjects were recruited using the online proprietary system developed at the Economic Science
Institute. We ran 8 sessions per treatment except for Neutral-Chat, for which
we ran only four session. Each session has 24 participants, which are randomly
assigned to a type. As a result there are 192 subjects per treatment except
15

for Neutral-Chat, which has 96 subjects. No subject had previous experience
with this game, 43% were males. On average, participants were paid about
USD 32, including a show-up fee of USD 7 and about USD 2 from an incentivized quiz to test subjects’ understanding of the instructions before the
start of the experiment. The average duration of a session was 1 hour and 40
minutes. Instructions were recorded in advance and played aloud at the beginning of a session, participants had also individual paper copies on their desks
(see Appendix B). We used neutral language for the instructions (words like
“cooperation” or “help” were never used). The instructions informed players
that only one of the ﬁve supergames would be randomly selected for payment,
with public random draw at the end of the experiment. The points earned
in that supergame were converted into dollars according to a pre-announced
conversion rate of USD 0.18 per point. After the instructions, subjects were
given the incentivized quiz to test their understanding of the instructions (see
Appendix B). The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). No eye contact was possible between participants and
supergames started and ended simultaneously for everyone. We collected demographic data via post-session anonymous surveys.

4

Theoretical predictions

Here we demonstrate that full cooperation is an equilibrium in all treatments
and all economies. Based on this, we then formulate three testable hypotheses.
The focus on full cooperation is motivated by the following observations:
Observation 1. Full cooperation is Pareto optimal in all economies.
Observation 2. Economic integration maximizes theoretical eﬃciency.
To see this, consider two reference outcomes: full cooperation (every pro16

ducer always cooperates) and full defection (no producer ever cooperates).
Outcomes in between, where some but not all producers cooperate all the
time, exhibit partial cooperation. Defection gives 6 points to a producer and
3 to a consumer. Consumers earn 9 + 2i + y points if cooperation occurs,
while producers earn nothing. Hence, full defection generates a total proﬁt of
6+3=9 points in every pair, of any economy, of any treatment. Instead, full
cooperation generates 9 + 2i + y points in a pair where the consumer is of
type i, where y = 0 in isolated economies, and y > 0 in integrated economies.
The implications are, ﬁrst, full cooperation is Pareto optimal as it creates
2i + y ≥ 2 surplus in all pairs. Second, since y > 0 only in mixed groups,
economic integration expands the theoretical eﬃciency frontier relative to isolated economies. Hence, forming a mixed group composed of all three player
types—choosing to economically integrate, that is —is the only way to maximize potential surplus and, hence, theoretical eﬃciency in Phase 2. Third,
integrated economies are inherently more eﬃcient, in that they can create as
much surplus as isolated economies with a lower cooperation rate. This implies that full cooperation is not necessary for integration to be economically
beneﬁcial. However, there is a danger: partial cooperation might create “winners” and “losers,” because, depending on the distribution of potential gains,
some type may end up beneﬁtting from integration while another may suﬀer.
Summing up, in our design full cooperation corresponds to eﬃcient play.
Subjects can maximize payoﬀs by fully cooperating in every economy, and
choosing a mixed group composed of all three player types, when given the
option. The question is thus: is eﬃcient play part of an equilibrium?
Proposition 1. Full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in all economies
and all treatments.
Proof. See Appendix A
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The proof relies on a version of Kandori (1992, Proposition 1), extended
to the case of heterogeneous players. Consider the following trigger strategy: a player always cooperates as a producer, but will forever defect if some
producer defects. At the end of each round players see whether their economy coordinated on full cooperation, or not. Hence, defecting in cooperative
equilibrium can be used to trigger an immediate and permanent sanction: always defect. This sanction is an equilibrium in the continuation game since
defection is a best response to everyone else defecting; so, it is incentivecompatible for a player to follow this sanction if everyone is expected to do
the same. A producer of type i has no incentive to deviate in equilibrium if
β ≥ β ∗ := 6/(6 + 2i + y), which—given the experimental parameters—is satisﬁed in all treatments and economy conﬁgurations. Hence, full cooperation
is part of a sequential equilibrium in our laboratory economies. By design,
the threshold value β ∗ is lowest in mixed groups because cooperation payoﬀs
are the largest (see Table A1 in Appendix A), indicating that, all else equal,
integrated economies provide the strongest monetary incentive to cooperate.
Hypotheses. Many equilibria exist in our setup and standard theory cannot
address selection issues without additional assumptions. A common assumption is that players are rational and seek to maximize their payoﬀs. If so, they
should attempt to coordinate on full cooperation in all economies, and should
select full integration in all treatments. To see why, note that the economic
incentives to coordinate on eﬃcient play are aligned across subjects (full cooperation is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium) and are strongest in mixed groups,
where cooperation generates the highest beneﬁt to every player. Hence, theory
suggests that full cooperation should be a focal outcome in every economy, and
that subjects should seek economic integration when given a choice. Moreover,
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behavior should not be aﬀected by the distribution of cooperation payoﬀs in
mixed groups. This leads us to put forward three hypotheses:
H 1. Treatments should not alter cooperation rates in mixed groups relative to
the baseline.
H 2. Treatments should not alter the distribution of economy conﬁguration
choices relative to the baseline.
H 3. Integration should be the majority choice in all treatments.
Empirically, strangers tend to cooperate below the theoretical maximum
(Bigoni et al., 2019; Camera et al., 2013a). Hence, H1 states that cooperation
rates in mixed groups should be the same across treatments, without predicting full cooperation. This hypothesis immediately extends to ﬁxed pairs, as
their payoﬀ structure is treatment-invariant. Similarly, H2-H3 state that economy conﬁguration choices should not vary based on treatment, and economic
integration should be the most frequent for all player types.
Our hypotheses hinge on assuming purely rational, self-interested players.
Alternative predictions could be formulated based on theoretical platforms
that incorporate other assumptions, such as fairness and inequality aversion
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or Rabin (1993).
These models give rise to an explicit trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity,
which is relevant to our model, as full cooperation supports payoﬀ heterogeneity. If fairness motivations dominate eﬃciency motivations, then it is conceivable that disadvantaged players might be unwilling to fully cooperate, to reach
a more balanced payoﬀ distribution; by occasionally breaking the cooperation
norm a player raises her payoﬀ at the expense of the average counterpart. Advantaged players with strong aversion to unequal payoﬀs might tolerate some
free-riding, cooperating even after suﬀering a defection to avoid sanctioning
counterparts who, on average, are less fortunate. These behaviors address
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inequality concerns at the expense of eﬃciency, crowding-out the gains from
cooperation. Hence, an alternative conjecture is that manipulating the distribution of potential gains might aﬀect subjects’ motivation to fully cooperate
in mixed groups, and to seek economic integration.10
Hence, the alternate hypothesis to H1 is that cooperation in mixed groups
will be aﬀected by treatment, although we cannot predict a speciﬁc direction.
If cooperation is aﬀected, then this might alter the economic incentives to interact in mixed groups and aﬀect the motivation to seek integration. Hence,
the alternate hypotheses to H2-H3 are that treatments will aﬀect the distribution of economy choices, and “stay” might not be the majority choice when
we move away from the baseline treatment.

5

Results

Here we ﬁrst focus on the four main treatments, studying cooperation and
eﬃciency in Phase 1, and then the economy conﬁguration choices in Phase
2. We conduct analyses at the session level, economy level, and individual
level.11 In a ﬁnal section, we then consider the impact of strategic uncertainty,
studying the Neutral-Chat treatment. Appendix B contains technical details.
10

Avoiding integration reduces potential surplus, while conditioning cooperation on (own)
type lowers the player’s payoﬀ in equilibrium because uncooperative actions trigger defections; oﬀ equilibrium, unconditional defection is a best response to others defecting.
Hence, players who are income-maximizing or who seek to maximize eﬃciency have no
economic reason to coordinate on less than full cooperation and to avoid integration.
11
For session-level analysis we have 8 independent observations per treatment, used to perform statistical tests. For economy-level analysis we have 192 observations for ﬁxed pairs
and 32 observations for mixed groups, in Phase 1, per treatment. Here, the only truly
independent observations are from supergame 1 (2 for mixed groups and 12 for ﬁxed pairs)
while the others may be correlated within a session; overall, in Phase 1 of each session we
have 4 (not independent) mixed groups and 24 (not independent) ﬁxed pairs. These possible correlations are mitigated by our strangers matching protocol, but are not entirely
eliminated. We address possible interdependencies by means of regression analysis with
cluster-robust standard errors, with clustering at the session level. Similar considerations
apply to subject-level analysis, where we have 192 observations per treatment.
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5.1

Cooperation in Phase 1

Here we focus on the average cooperation rate in an economy (calculated
in Appendix B) because, together with the economy conﬁguration, is what
determines the economy’s performance. To explain, let proﬁt denote the points
earned by a subject in the average round of a supergame; it depends on:
(i) the subject’s cooperation rate, (ii) the choices of the subject’s producer
counterparts, and (iii) the payoﬀ matrix applying to the economy. Per-capita
proﬁts in the economy are directly proportional to average cooperation, going
from a minimum of 4.5 points (no cooperation—any economy) to between 5.5
and 7.5 points (full cooperation—ﬁxed pair, depending on type of players), to
8 or 9 points (full cooperation—mixed group, 9 only in Neutral+).
Result 1. Redistributing or increasing potential gains did not alter cooperation
rates in mixed groups, which remained as low as in the Neutral baseline.
Cooperation rates are similarly low in all treatments. The mean cooperation rate in a mixed group is 0.397, 0.384, 0.333, and 0.421 in, respectively,
Neutral, Converge, Diverge and Neutral+ (with s.d., respectively, 0.198, 0.185,
0.176, and 0.192). Furthermore, cooperation rates decline as the supergame
progresses, in all treatments; see Fig. B1 in Appendix B.
Using a session as the independent unit of observation, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of identical cooperation rates for any treatment pair, at the
10% signiﬁcance level (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests with exact statistics
N1=N2=8); this holds true also if we consider only endogenously formed mixed
groups in Phase 2; see Appendix B. A GLM regression that controls for
individual characteristics conﬁrms this view; we can only detect a diﬀerence at
the 10% level between Diverge and Neutral+; see the marginal eﬀects reported
in col. 1 of Table B3 in Appendix B. This assessment is robust to considering
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only Phase 2 data (see col. 2 of Table B3 in Appendix B), and is also robust
to considering only the ﬁrst round of play in mixed groups.12
Based on this evidence we cannot reject H1 for mixed groups. Removing or
increasing inequality of opportunity did not impact overall cooperation rates.
There is also no signiﬁcant eﬀect when we equally increased the economic
incentive to cooperate in mixed groups by about 70%, in Neutral+. The largest
diﬀerence in cooperation (and, hence, eﬃciency) is 0.065 (Neutral vs. Diverge).
By means of comparison consider that in a public good experiment, Kölle
(2015) ﬁnds that social eﬃciency falls by 0.17 when moving from groups with
a symmetric to an asymmetric payoﬀ matrix. A natural question is thus how
small a treatment eﬀect we could detect given our design.13 We thus perform
a two-sample mean power analysis using one mixed group in Phase 1 as the
unit of observation (N = 64 for our balanced sample, 32 per treatment). We
ran one-sided tests where the control group mean and s.d. comes from Neutral,
while the s.d. of the treated group comes from the other three treatments. The
null hypothesis is that mean cooperation should be unaﬀected by treatment.
The alternative hypothesis is that cooperation should increase in Converge and
Neutral+ (less payoﬀ inequality and larger payoﬀs, respectively), and fall in
Diverge (more payoﬀ inequality). Given a 10% signiﬁcance level, the smallest
detectable eﬀect sizes are about 0.12 and 0.10 for a power of 0.9 and 0.8,
respectively (0.14 and 0.12 if two-sided tests). This suggests that our design
has enough power to detect economically meaningful distributional eﬀects—an
increase in cooperation of at least 10 percentage points—and not minor eﬀects.
12

In Phase 1, round 1 cooperation rates are 0.46, 0.60, 0.44 and 0.55, for Neutral, Converge, Diverge and Neutral+. Using two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we can only reject
the hypothesis that round 1 cooperation rates are similar in Converge vs. Diverge (pvalue=0.0995, N1=N2=8). Using a logit panel regression, we cannot reject the null of
identical round 1 cooperation rates for any treatment comparison; see Appendix B.
13
We thank an anonymous Referee for suggesting this additional analysis.
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It is natural to ask if the lack of treatment eﬀects stems from data aggregation hiding possible oﬀsetting impacts on the diﬀerent types. We can reject the
hypothesis that treatments altered behavior of player types in mixed groups.
Result 2. Redistributing or increasing potential gains did not alter cooperation
rates of any player type in mixed groups, relative to the Neutral baseline.
Fig. 2 reports mean cooperation rates in mixed groups of Phase 1, by
player type, and overall.
Figure 2: Cooperation by Player Type in Mixed Groups (Phase 1)
1
Overall

Disadv.

Middle
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Cooperation Rate
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Neutral

Converge

Diverge
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Notes: One obs.=one mixed group. The markers identify the mean, the whiskers identify
the 95% conﬁdence interval. Moving left to right, mean cooperation rates of disadvantaged
types are 0.38, 0.39, 0.31, 0.40, for middle are 0.39, 0.35, 0.30, 0.39, and for advantaged are
0.42, 0.41, 0.40, 0.48.

We fail to reject the null that cooperation of a given type is identical for all
three relevant comparisons at the 10% signiﬁcance level (two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests with exact statistics, N1=N2=8, one observation = one session). A GLM regression conﬁrms that neither redistributing nor increasing
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potential gains aﬀected the conduct of any player type, relative to Neutral;
see the treatment coeﬃcients in Table B5 in Appendix B. Hence, we cannot
reject H1 even when focusing on speciﬁc player types: reshuﬄing potential
gains to remove inequality of opportunity, increasing it, or boosting potential
gains for all did not aﬀect cooperation in mixed groups.
Within each treatment, diﬀerent types cooperated similarly except in Diverge. Here, potential earnings strongly diverged and advantaged players (type
3) cooperated signiﬁcantly more than everyone else in their mixed group by
about 8 to 10 percentage points (see Table B7 in Appendix B). These ﬁndings
are robust to inclusion of Phase 2 data (see Tables B6 and B8). This suggests
that inequality factors can inﬂuence cooperation choices within the economy,
and for this to happen inequality must be suﬃciently pronounced. An important question is whether subjects beneﬁtted from interacting in mixed groups
instead of ﬁxed pairs. This is discussed in the next two results.
Result 3. Subjects cooperated less in mixed groups than in ﬁxed pairs.
Mean cooperation rates in ﬁxed pairs of Phase 1 are 0.776, 0.773, 0.656, and
0.668 in, respectively, Neutral, Converge, Diverge and Neutral+. Using a session
as the independent unit of observation, we can only reject the null hypothesis of identical cooperation rates for Neutral vs. Neutral+, and Converge vs.
Neutral+ (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests with exact statistics, N1=N2=8,
p-values=0.0225, 0.0207); no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerges when
we consider only Phase 2 data (Table B1 in Appendix B). Using a GLM regression that controls for individual characteristics, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of identical cooperation rates across treatments, except for Neutral
vs. Diverge (Phase 1 data only, see Table B9 in Appendix B). Finally, note
that, unlike mixed groups, ﬁxed pairs exhibit a stable cooperation trend in all
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treatments; see Fig. B1 in Appendix B.
Comparing ﬁxed pairs to mixed groups in Phase 1, we reject the null of
identical cooperation at the 1% signiﬁcance level in all treatments (Wilcoxon
signed rank tests on matched observations about mean cooperation in ﬁxed
pairs and in mixed groups, one observation is one subject in a session, N=192
per treatment). This shows that subjects coordinated on similarly high cooperation rates in ﬁxed pairs (for the most part), and similarly low rates in
mixed groups, in all treatments. The outcome of these cooperation diﬀerences
is described next.
Result 4. Economic integration did not improve economic outcomes in Phase
1, except in Neutral+, and created winners and losers in all treatments. Realized gains from integration were generally positive for the disadvantaged, and
negative for the advantaged.
In our Neutral baseline, potential gains from integration are 1.5 points percapita, as each consumer can earn 3 more points relative to ﬁxed pairs. Average
potential gains are still 1.5 points in Converge and Diverge, but vary depending
on the player type (from 2.5 to 0.5 points, see Table 2). In Neutral+ they are
2.5 points for every player.
Realized gains from integration in Phase 1 are well below potential in all
treatments, and in some cases even negative. The diﬀerence between average
proﬁts in mixed groups and ﬁxed pairs is -0.187, -0.207, -0.0956, and 0.501
in, respectively, Neutral, Converge, Diverge and Neutral+. We reject the null
of identical payoﬀs in ﬁxed pairs and mixed groups at the 1% level in Neutral
and Neutral+, and at the 5% level in Converge (Wilcoxon signed rank tests
on matched observations about mean cooperation in ﬁxed pairs and in mixed
groups, in Phase 1, one observation is one subject in a session, N=192 per
treatment). This assessment is conﬁrmed by linear regressions that control for
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order of play and individual characteristics (Table B10 in Appendix B).
Table 3: Realized Gains from Economic Integration (Phase 1)

Disadvantaged
Middle
Advantaged
Total

Neutral

Converge

Diverge

Neutral+

+0.39 (0.250)
−0.16 (0.547)
−0.78 (0.312)
-0.187

+0.57 (0.039)
−0.24 (0.312)
−0.95 (0.023)
-0.207

−0.19 (0.109)
+0.06 (0.742)
−0.15 (0.742)
-0.0956

+0.98 (0.008)
+0.72 (0.039)
−0.20 (0.461)
0.501

Notes: One obs.=one type of player in a session, Phase 1. We report mean realized proﬁts
in mixed groups minus ﬁxed pairs, for each player type (ﬁrst three rows), and as an average
for the economy (Total row); in parentheses p-values from signed-rank tests on matched
observations (mixed groups vs. ﬁxed pairs, N1=N2=8). Maximum theoretical gains are 1.5
and 2.5 points in Neutral and Neutral+; 1.5 for Middle players in all treatments; 2.5 and 0.5
points for Advantaged and Disadvantaged in Diverge, and the reverse in Converge.

Table 3 breaks down realized gains in Phase 1, by player type. A positive
value means that integration is empirically beneﬁcial for that type. Realized
gains are about zero for every type in Neutral and Diverge. They are negative
for the advantaged and positive for the disadvantaged in Converge. They are
positive for most types only in Neutral+, where cooperation beneﬁts increased
for everyone relative to Neutral. We establish the statistical signiﬁcance of
these observations using Wilcoxon signed rank tests on matched observations
(ﬁxed pairs and mixed groups). The unit of observation is one type in a session
(N=8 per type, per treatment). We reject the null of identical mean proﬁts
for the disadvantaged in Converge and Neutral+, the advantaged in Converge
and middle players in Neutral+ (p-values in Table 3).
Summing up, integration in Phase 1 was economically unsuccessful except
in Neutral+, where small gains were obtained. Moreover, integration separated
types into winners and losers, increasing economic heterogeneity.14
14

In all treatments, there are also winners and losers within the same player type. If we
interpret a type as a country, then this observation would seem consistent with interna-
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5.2

Economy configuration choices

In Phase 2, participants expressed their preference for the economy to be
implemented in the last supergame. We report the following:
Result 5. Economic integration was not the majority choice, but was chosen
more frequently when potential gains grew.
Fig. 3 reports (relative) frequencies of economy conﬁguration choices.
Figure 3: Economy Conﬁguration Choices (Phase 2).
1
Leave

Exclude

Stay

Relative frequency

.8

.6

.4

.2

0
Diverge

Neutral

Converge

Neutral+

Notes: One obs.= one session (N = 8 per treatment). Relative frequency of choice “leave”,
“exclude” and “stay.” The whiskers identify the mean standard error.

“Exclude” pools the two exclusion choices available to a player, each directed at excluding either one of the two other types. Hence, we have three
possible choices: “stay” in the 24-player mixed group (economic integration),
scale it down to 16 players by excluding one type, or “leave” to interact in
a ﬁxed pair (isolated economy). Three observations stand out. First, in the
tional trade theories. Yet, these diﬀerences within a type are due to unequal cooperation
rates, with frequent cooperators being “losers” and frequent defectors “winners.”
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Neutral baseline, choice frequencies are inversely related to the economy size
implied by that choice. “Leave” is the most frequent choice (0.47), followed by
“Exclude” (0.33) to interact in a 16-player economy, while “Stay” is the least
preferred (0.20). This pattern is largely unaﬀected in treatments where we
redistribute potential gains from integration. There is evidence of a treatment
eﬀect only when potential gains increase across the board, in Neutral+, where
the choices are equally frequent.15
The preference for “exclude” over “stay” is interesting because subjects
had no experience with 16- and 24-player groups. They knew that scaling
the group down to 16 players would not aﬀect their cooperation beneﬁt, but
would reduce that of the excluded type—which is socially ineﬃcient. So why
did subjects go for “exclude” instead of “stay”? A possible reason is a desire
to mitigate strategic uncertainty, which increases as the number of possible
counterparts increases.
Redistributing potential gains from integration does not aﬀect the preference for isolation. It simply aﬀects the preference for the size of mixed groups.
As potential gains ﬂows from the advantaged to the disadvantaged, the difference between “exclude” and “stay” drops from 0.21 (in Diverge) to 0.05 (in
Converge). “Leave” is unaﬀected. In fact, “leave” remains the majority choice
unless potential gains jump for everyone—though doing so did not signiﬁcantly
increase the frequency of “stay” relative to the baseline case.16
15

Using a session as an independent observation, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality
of frequencies of “leave” and “stay,” against the alternative that “leave” is more frequent
in Converge, Neutral, and Diverge (one-sided signtest, p-values=0.0352, 0.0078, 0.0039 ,
N1=N2=8) but not in Neutral+ (p-value=0.6367). We can reject the null of equality of
frequencies of “leave” and “exclude,” against the alternative that “leave” is more frequent
for Neutral and Converge (p-values=0.0352 in each case) but not Diverge and Neutral+
(p-values=0.6563, 0.9648). We reject the null of equal frequencies for “exclude” and
“stay,” against the alternative that “exclude” is more frequent in Neutral and Diverge
(p-values=0.0625, 0.0156) but not in Converge and Neutral+ (p-values=0.5000, 0.1445).
16
Using two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics we cannot
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Based on this evidence, we can reject H2. The results suggest a strong
attractiveness for interaction that can be based on reciprocity, which was unaﬀected by the redistributive interventions in the experiment. However, we
do see a signiﬁcant shift in preferences away from isolation and towards integration, in Neutral+. Does this mean that a general improvement in potential
gains from integration is suﬃcient to make it more attractive?
Result 6. The economy conﬁguration choices reﬂected variation in realized
gains from integration, not in size or distribution of potential gains.
We disentangle the eﬀect of realized and potential gains from integration
with a multinomial logit regression that controls for realized gains. We regress
a subject’s economy choice on Realized Gains, which is standardized. A categorical variable soaks up treatment eﬀects (Neutral is the base case), which is
interacted with Realized Gains. An order dummy and standard controls are
included. Marginal eﬀects are summarized in Table 4.
Realized gains have a primary inﬂuence on economy conﬁguration choices.17
One standard deviation increase in realized gains signiﬁcantly lowers the probability of choosing “leave” by 19 percentage points, while “exclude” or “stay”
grow by 7 and 12 points; see the coeﬃcients on Realized Gains (columns 2
and 3 are statistically similar, Wald test, p-value=0.560). Subjects rationally
responded to economic incentives, basing their choice to seek integration or
reject the null of equal frequency of “leave” choices in any of the ﬁrst three treatments, at
the 10% level. We can reject that the diﬀerence between “exclude” and “stay” frequencies
is equal in Diverge and Converge (p-value=0.0959, N1=N2=8). We can reject the null of
identical “leave” choices in Neutral and Neutral+, but not “stay” (p-values=0.047,0.165).
17
Participants’ realized gains depend on their relative cooperativeness, with cooperators
being more likely to have losses from integration and free-riders gains. The reason is
that cooperators are more easily exploited by free riders in mixed groups (vs. ﬁxed pairs)
because strangers’ interaction prevents identiﬁcation and directly sanctioning of free riders.
This issue is studied in Bigoni et al. (2019, p.210-11), which provides evidence on this
point and reveals that—as self-selection is ruled out—free riders more frequently select
large groups, while cooperators ﬁxed pairs.
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isolation on realized earnings, not potential earnings. Once we control for this,
choices are unaﬀected by treatment manipulations. All coeﬃcients on treatment dummies are insigniﬁcant, meaning that manipulating the distribution
or overall size of potential gains did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect choices.
Table 4: Economy Conﬁguration Choices–Marginal Eﬀects
Dep. variable=
Economy choice
Treatment
Converge
Diverge
Neutral+
Realized Gain
Order (12-12-2-2)
Controls
N

Leave
(1)

Exclude
(2)

Stay
(3)

-0.031
(0.070)
0.002
(0.059)
-0.094
(0.062)
-0.190***
(0.044)
-0.133***
(0.042)
Yes
768

-0.019
(0.044)
0.030
(0.047)
0.028
(0.039)
0.070
(0.053)
0.001
(0.036)
Yes
768

0.051
(0.054)
-0.032
(0.038)
0.066
(0.048)
0.120***
(0.044)
0.132***
(0.036)
Yes
768

Notes: Multinomial logit regression on preferences for choices of endogenous conﬁguration.
One observation = one subject in a session. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted
for clustering at session level. The categorical variable Treatment corresponds to the four
treatments (Neutral is the base case). Realized Gains is the standardized diﬀerence in
earnings between mixed groups and ﬁxed pairs of Phase 1, and is interacted with Treatment.
Controls at the individual level consisting of the subject’s sex and our two standardized
measures of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the postinstruction quiz). Marginal eﬀects are computed at the regressors’ mean value (at zero for
indicator variables). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.

Summing up, economy conﬁguration choices are not elastic to the manipulations of potential gains from integration that we considered. Seen this way,
inequality of opportunity or the size of prospective gains do not seem to be the
primary reasons behind the choice to seek or avoid integration, in the experiment. A key element was subjects’ personal experience with integration in
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Phase 1. A negative experience pushed them towards isolation, and a positive
towards integration. Except for Neutral+, only a minority of players experience positive realized gains, which explains why in all treatments but Neutral+
the majority choice was to steer clear of economic integration.18
Finally, we document choices of the diﬀerent player types. We ask: once
we account for realized gains, was economic integration chosen with similar
frequency by the diﬀerent player types? If not, what biases do we observe?
Result 7. In each treatment, the choice to “stay” was similar across types.
We ran multinomial logit regressions using one subject in a session as the
observation unit. We regress a subject’s group choice on the continuous regressor Realized Gains, an order dummy, the standard controls used earlier.
We use the “type” factor variable to assess diﬀerences between player types
(Disadvantaged is the base case). The coeﬃcients are estimated separately for
each treatment. Marginal eﬀects are in Table 5.
We do not see a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the probability of choosing “stay.” This
similarity extends to the other two possible economy conﬁguration choices, in
treatments where potential gains were identically distributed. Panels A and D
reveal that player types made similar choices in treatments where the potential
gains from integration were identically distributed. None of the coeﬃcients is
signiﬁcant, and we cannot reject the null of equal coeﬃcients on Middle and
18

We can reject the null that cooperative participants have a higher propensity to choose the
socially eﬃcient 24-player group. We categorize subjects into three groups (low, moderate,
high) based on cooperation relative to their opponent(s), for ﬁxed pairs and mixed groups
of Phase 1. This categorical variable is used in a regression model as in Table 4, but
omitting realized gains. Relative cooperativeness in ﬁxed pairs does not aﬀect group
choices. Instead, Low cooperators in mixed groups are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose
the socially eﬃcient “stay” choice, while high cooperators are signiﬁcantly less likely to
do so. This evidence is consistent with the results in Bigoni et al. (2019), suggesting that
high cooperators avoid mixed groups to coordinate on cooperation with a ﬁxed partner,
while low cooperators seek large groups where free-riding cannot be directly sanctioned.
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Advantaged, for any of the three possible choices (Wald tests). Some diﬀerences in the other two choices, “leave” and “exclude” emerge in treatments
where potential gains were unequally distributed. Panels B and C show that
Advantaged players selected “leave” more frequently than the Disadvantaged,
and “exclude” less frequently. This “isolation bias” reﬂects the distribution
of potential gains to some extent. Advantaged players selected “leave” more
frequently than the Disadvantaged, respectively by about 18 and 9 percentage
point in Converge and in Diverge. There is a corresponding diﬀerence of the
opposite sign in the frequency of “exclude,” which is interesting because it
reveals that all types shared a similar inclination regarding “stay.”19
Table 5: Inequality of Opportunity and Economy Conﬁguration Choices
Dep. var. =
1 if vote

Panel A: Neutral
Leave
Exclude
Stay

Panel B: Converge
Leave
Exclude Stay

Middle

-0.079
(0.111)
-0.031
(0.106)

0.108
(0.155)
0.181*
(0.105)

Advantaged

Middle
Advantaged

0.121
(0.098)
0.068
(0.079)

-0.042
(0.039)
-0.037
(0.029)

-0.165
(0.104)
-0.187*
(0.101)

0.056
(0.105)
0.006
(0.086)

Panel C: Diverge
Leave
Exclude
Stay

Panel D: Neutral+
Leave
Exclude Stay

-0.069
(0.108)
0.091**
(0.036)

0.057
(0.126)
-0.125
(0.137)

0.109
(0.110)
-0.093**
(0.046)

-0.040
(0.083)
0.002
(0.033)

0.021
(0.107)
0.026
(0.159)

-0.079
(0.049)
0.100
(0.095)

Notes: Multinomial logit regressions on preferences for choices of endogenous conﬁguration.
Marginal Eﬀects. One observation = one subject in a session. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) adjusted for clustering at session level. The categorical variable corresponds to
the three types of players (Disadvantaged is the base case). Each panel refers to a separate
regression, using data for the speciﬁed treatment. For other details see notes to Table 4.
19

Middle players behave similarly to Disadvantaged. They fall in-between Advantaged and
Disadvantaged. We can only reject the null of equal coeﬃcients on Middle and Advantaged
for the “exclude” choice in Panel C (Wald test, p-value=0.0139). Table B12 in Appendix
B reports the distribution of choices by type.
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Summing up, the preference for economic integration is unaﬀected by disparities in potential gains from integration. All player types selected full economic integration (“stay”) with a similar frequency, independent of size and
distribution of potential gains. We can also rule out that players of diﬀerent
types made diﬀerent group choices in the Neutral and Neutral+ treatments,
where potential gains from integration are equally distributed. Instead, when
potential gains from economic integration are unequally distributed (the Converge and Diverge treatments) we observe that Advantaged players choose differently than the Disadvantaged. They exhibit a lower frequency of “exclude”
choice and a higher frequency of “leave” choice. We interpret this evidence as
suggesting that, under unequal distributions, “leave” became a more attractive
alternative to players who had an economic advantage to start with.

5.3

The role of strategic uncertainty

In the experiment full cooperation requires tacit coordination on a risky and
complex dynamic strategy. It is thus possible that our results on group choices
depend on the strategic uncertainty present in mixed groups preventing cooperation and, hence, gains from integration.20 Here we reduce strategic uncertainty by introducing pre-play communication in free-form. This was shown
to improve contributions in public-goods experiments among partners (e.g.,
Chan et al., 1999; Dekel et al., 2017; Gangadharan et al., 2017; Isaac and
Walker, 1988b; Tavoni et al., 2011) and to facilitate eﬃcient play in indeﬁnitely repeated games among strangers (e.g., Camera et al., 2013b, 2020b).
The Neutral-Chat treatment pursues this idea, introducing costless pre-play
free-form communication in Neutral. Before each Phase 1 supergame, participants can communicate with each other using a chat-box, for up to two
20

We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry.
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minutes. No communication is possible in Phase 2, to avoid explicit coordination on group selection. We ran four sessions with the order 2-2-12-12, which
we compare to the four similar Neutral sessions.
As Neutral-Chat allows explicit coordination on a strategy, we expect higher
cooperation in mixed groups, hence positive realized gains from integration in
Phase 1. This experience should support the belief of high cooperation in
future mixed groups, encouraging the selection of fully integrated economies
in Phase 2. Given this belief, “leave” is economically suboptimal for an individual, while “exclude” simply hurt others without providing a direct personal
economic beneﬁt (although reducing the economy size might mitigate strategic
uncertainty—an indirect beneﬁt). This suggests two testable hypotheses:
H 4. In Phase 1, mixed groups cooperate more with than without pre-play
communication.
H 5. In Phase 2, “stay” is more frequently selected with than without pre-play
communication.
Neither hypothesis can be rejected. Average cooperation rates in mixed
groups of Phase 1 are 0.939 in Neutral-Chat vs. 0.516 in Neutral, a highly
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (GLM regression, col. 1, Table B13 in Appendix B). The
ability to explicitly coordinate strategies promoted eﬃcient play, which led
to nearly universal gains from integration: 95 out of 96 subjects had gains
in Neutral-Chat, 1.61 points on average, while only 55 out of 96 gained in
Neutral, 0.42 points on average. The four-fold increase in average gains from
integration motivated a more frequent choice of mixed groups. In Neutral-Chat
the frequency of choice of “leave” was .08, “exclude” 0.41, and “stay” 0.51,
while the opposite pattern is observed in Neutral (0.47, 0.33, and 0.20). The
diﬀerences in frequencies are statistically signiﬁcant for “leave” and “stay”
(two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics, p34

values=0.002,0.002, N1=N2=4). This change in attitudes towards economic
integration led to the formation of 24-player groups in 2 of the 4 sessions of
Neutral-Chat as opposed to none in Neutral.
Did subjects choose rationally or were their expectations about behavior
in mixed groups mistaken? When we pool together all mixed groups of Phase
2 (N=4 per treatment), average cooperation is 0.749 in Neutral-Chat vs. 0.399
in Neutral, a statistically signiﬁcant increase (col. 2 in Table B13). As a result,
61 out of 80 subjects who participated in a mixed group of Phase 2 earned
more than they did in ﬁxed pairs of Phase 1 (average gain = 0.94 points).
This contrasts with only 29 out of 64 subjects in the four comparable Neutral
sessions for an average gain of -0.03 points.
To understand if this change in preference for economic integration is entirely explained by the greater gains experienced in Phase 1, we run a multinomial logit regression that controls for realized gains; see Table B14 in Appendix
B. There is a large and signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect, suggesting that free-form
communication contributed to shift subjects’ attitudes toward forming large
heterogeneous groups. That is to say, the beneﬁt of the chat box went beyond
simply increasing the expectation of high payoﬀs in mixed groups. Still, there
is no clear majority for “stay.” In fact, many subjects chose to exclude some
player type from the mixed group. Out of 96 subjects, 24 chose to exclude
the disadvantaged, while 7 and 8, respectively, chose to exclude the other two
types of players. Since excluding a player type reduces the heterogeneity in
the group, without altering the payoﬀ matrix, this suggests that resolving
strategic uncertainty issues did not remove the aversion to interacting in large
heterogeneous groups as some subjects tried to minimize it.
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6

Discussion

What may induce a country to avoid an open-trade policy? From the perspective of international economics, it is primarily the possibility that the
economic gains envisioned for the average citizen may come at the expense of
absolute losses for some of them (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). Our experiment reveals that this may happen even if everyone has a potential absolute
gain because attaining the gains from trade is not a mechanical process, but
requires cooperation on a large scale. In the experiment, every participant
could theoretically earn more in mixed groups than in ﬁxed pairs, economic
integration was potentially beneﬁcial, but these gains did not materialize because participants did not coordinate on a cooperative strategy. This diﬃculty
together with heterogeneous potential gains created winners and losers from
economic integration, which ultimately undermined support for it.
This suggests the importance of accounting for behavioral aspects that
may inﬂuence individuals’ perception of economic integration. One may object
that subjects in the experiment did not understand the potential gains from
integration. Although possible, this is an unlikely explanation for our results.
The instructions informed subjects of the cooperation beneﬁts in mixed groups
vs. ﬁxed pairs and our regressions control for understanding of instructions
using a post-instruction quiz, which showed how to calculate earnings under
full cooperation and full defection in any group.
The experiment provides several insights about factors that might preclude
potential gains from integration to be attained outside of the lab. First, the
scale of interaction is a primary obstacle to cooperation, due to coordination
problems, while inequality of economic opportunity does not appear to directly aﬀect cooperation. In the experiment, cooperation did not improve in
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mixed groups when its beneﬁts where equalized or increased across the board
(Results 1-2) and was always low (Result 3). Second, inequality of opportunity aﬀects the choice to aggregate into larger groups because low cooperation
splits the group into absolute winners and losers (Result 4-7). To the extent that expanding trade beyond local boundaries requires greater reliance
on self-enforcing agreements, integration is more likely to deliver its promised
beneﬁts—and thus to be supported—when it can leverage institutions that facilitate coordination and mitigate strategic uncertainty, and foster an overall
trust between countries. Seen this way, the experiment suggests that the backlash against integration can hardly be ascribed to a communication failure of
policymakers and economists, say, because the potential beneﬁts are unequal
across countries or not made transparent to the public. It suggests that the
distribution of gains realized in those countries that did pursue an integration
policy aﬀected subsequent attitudes toward that policy.21
What explains the eﬃciency failure from economic integration in the experiment? As we move from ﬁxed pairs to mixed groups: (i) we go from
partner to strangers matching, (ii) the average cooperation beneﬁt increases
from 13 to 16 points, and (iii) we shift from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous economy where cooperation beneﬁts diﬀer. Each of these changes might
inﬂuence cooperation in its own way. It could fall as we go from partners to
strangers or as we shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous economies, while
it could rise as its average beneﬁt increases. To disentangle these three potential eﬀects consider the following. In previous experiments with homogeneous
21

Fetzer (2019) notes that the austerity-induced welfare reform in the UK may have created
losses that partly made economic integration seem responsible for their fate. Fetzer and
Wang (2020) oﬀer a measure of the economic cost of Brexit, in the very short-run. They
ﬁnd sizable and unevenly distributed costs across the 382 U.K districts, and classify about
168 districts as losers, 78 as winners, and the remaining as neither. Interestingly, they
also ﬁnd more pronounced losses in districts that more strongly supported Leave.
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players cooperation signiﬁcantly declined as interaction shifted from partners
to strangers matching, when cooperation beneﬁts were constant (Camera et
al., 2013a), and also when they increased (Bigoni et al., 2019). Moreover,
in our experiment cooperation did not improve in Neutral+, when the average cooperation beneﬁt increased while keeping constant inequality in beneﬁts
and strangers matching. Camera and Hohl (2021) compares homogeneous to
heterogeneous mixed groups similar to ours by varying the distribution of cooperation beneﬁts, while keeping constant mean beneﬁts and strangers matching.
Using their data, we carried out an analysis (see section B.9 in Appendix B) revealing that the mean-invariant redistribution of beneﬁts did not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect cooperation. The survey of related experiments in Bigoni et al. (2020,
Section 3) shows that when other aspects of the design change (e.g., continuation probability, role alternation, information), we still see lower cooperation
in strangers settings. Overall, this suggests that integration failed to improve
eﬃciency primarily due to the shift from partners to strangers matching, not
due to the induced heterogeneity in prospective payoﬀs.
Supposing that these laboratory results reﬂect a principle of behavior that
also underlies external decision processes, what policy considerations can we
make given the current disintegration tendencies? First, it has been argued
that standard models of trade in goods and services may underestimate the
gains from trade by not taking into account the dynamics of innovation in
integrated markets (Desmet et al., forth.; Ossa, 2015). This may suggest that,
as a matter of policy, advertising more optimistic prospects to the public might
itself improve attitudes toward integration. The experiment does not support
this view if we narrowly consider the results from Neutral+ where cooperation
did not improve relative to the baseline even if prospective integration beneﬁts
were much better. As a result, the 24-player group was infrequently selected.
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The main barrier to cooperation and integration seems the signiﬁcant strategic uncertainty under which participants had to make decisions (see Bigoni et
al., 2019, and our Neutral-Chat treatment): cooperation required tacit coordination on a complicated dynamic strategy involving community sanctions.
Institutions designed to foster coordination, open communication and a spirit
of cohesion in the international arena thus seem fundamental. It is also possible that in the experiment the potential integration beneﬁts were not large
enough to dominate the underlying strategic uncertainty; it is an open question if more robust economic prospects would be alone suﬃcient to overcome
barriers to cooperation and integration.
Second, the experiment reveals that although inequality in prospective
economic beneﬁts might not directly inﬂuence integration attitudes, it indirectly does so in uncooperative environments by creating sharp economic
imbalances—absolute losers alongside winners. This suggests that there is
scope for cross-country redistributive ﬁscal policies to limit strong negative
eﬀects on some groups caused by integration. This last aspect is in line with
ﬁndings on Brexit (Fetzer, 2019), and is especially relevant if we think of integration beneﬁts in the experiment as embedding also a “political” component.
If so, the loss in political sovereignty that is generally associated with economic
integration should also be accounted for to calculate the beneﬁts perceived by
some countries but—due to diﬀerent cultural views— not others. This may
also contribute to explain the disintegration trends we have been witnessing.
There are limitations of our study that must be considered in assessing
the external validity of our experiment. Three, in particular, stand out: the
binary-choice design, the lack of prices, and the exogenous distribution of the
potential gains from integration. In our design each interaction involves a binary choice over two extreme cooperation levels: either full or none. However,
39

human and commercial interactions are more complex, and allow a much wider
range of choice. For example, partners might ﬁnd it easy to fully cooperate
from the start of an interaction, while strangers might not, starting from a
low, but non-zero, level which is then raised to is full potential once trust gets
established. If so, then our study likely overestimates the negative impact of
economic integration on cooperation. We also excluded prices, which are key
determinants of international trade ﬂows in ﬁeld economies and, hence, the
beneﬁts of economic integration. Consumers in our design could not entice
strangers to cooperate by oﬀering some of the surplus created by their cooperative action. In a way, prices are ﬁxed, which might have contributed to
reduce cooperation rates among strangers and, consequently, the desirability
of economic integration. Finally, the determination of winners and losers from
integration is not fully endogenous in our design, being aﬀected by the assumed
heterogeneity in payoﬀs and potential gains from integration. This might create gains (or losses) that are artiﬁcially low—relative to a fully endogenous
determination—or, conversely, artiﬁcially high. As a result, this would end
up either understating or overstating the true backlash against integration, we
would expect in the ﬁeld. These features of our design are limitations from an
external validity perspective, and natural candidates for further investigation.
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Antràs, P. and E. Rossi-Hansberg. (2009). Organizations and Trade. Annual
Review of Economics 1(1), 43-64.
Balafoutas, L., M. Kocher, L. Putterman, and M. Sutter. 2013. Equality, equity
and incentives: an experiment. European Economic Review 60, 35-51.
Baland, J.M., Gangadharan, L., Maitra, P., and Somanathan, R. (2017). Repayment and exclusion in a microﬁnance experiment, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 137, 176-190.
Barrett, S. and Dannenberg, A. (2012) Climate negotiations under scientiﬁc
uncertainty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 17372-17376.
Bigoni, M., Camera, G., and Casari M. (2019) Partners or Strangers? Cooperation, monetary trade, and the choice of scale of interaction. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(2), 195-227.
Bigoni, M., Camera, G., and Casari M. (2020). Cooperation among strangers
with and without a monetary system. In C. Monica Capra, Rachel Croson,
Mary Rigdon and Tanya Rosenblat (eds), Handbook of Experimental Game
Theory, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 213-240.
Bolton, G.E, Ockenfels, A., 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity and
competition. American Economic Review 90, 166-193.
Buckley, E., and Croson, R. 2006. Income and wealth heterogeneity in the
voluntary provision of linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 90
(4-5), 935-955.
Camera, G., and Hohl, L. (2021). Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an
experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 188, 903-915.
Camera, G., Casari, M., and Bigoni, M. (2013a). Money and trust among
strangers. Proc. of the Nat. Ac. of Sciences of the U.S., 110(37), 1488914893.
Camera, G., Casari M., and Bigoni, M. (2013b) Experimental Markets with
Frictions. Journal of Economic Surveys 27(3), 536-553.
Camera, G., Deck, C., and Porter, D. (2020a). Do Economic Inequalities Aﬀect
Long-Run Cooperation and Prosperity? Experimental Economics.

41

Camera, G., D. Goldberg, and A. Weiss (2020b). Endogenous market formation and monetary trade: an experiment. Journal of the European Economic
Association 18(3), 1553-1588
Cappelen, A. W., Eichele, T., Hugdahl, K., Specht, K., Sørensen, E., and
Tungodden, B. (2014). Equity theory and fair inequality: A neuroeconomic
study. Proc. of the Nat. Acad. of Science of the U.S. 111(43), 15368-15372.
Chakraborty, I., Hai, R., Holter, H.A., and Stepanchuk, S. (2017). The Real
Eﬀects of Financial (Dis)integration: A Multi-Country Equilibrium Analysis
of Europe. Journal of Monetary Economics, 85, 28-45.
Chan, K.S., Mestelman, S., Moir, R., and Muller, R.A. 1999. Heterogeneity
and the voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics, 2(1),
5-30.
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., and Putterman, L. (2005). Cooperation under
the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of Public
Economics, 89(8), 1421-1435.
Costinot A., and Rodrı́guez-Clare A. (2018). The US Gains From Trade: Valuation Using the Demand for Foreign Factor Services Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 32(2), 3-24.
Croson, R., Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T., and Morales, J. (2015). Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 114, 13-26.
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Güth, W., Levati, V., Sutter, M., and Van der Heijden, E. (2007). Leading
by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution
experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 91(5), 1023-1042.
Hakobyan, S., and J. McLaren (2016). Looking for Local Labor Market Eﬀects
of NAFTA. Review of Economics and Statistics 98(4), 728-41.
Hargreaves Heap, S. P., A. Ramalingam, and B.V. Stoddard (2016). Endowment inequality in public goods games: A re-examination. Economics Letters, 146, 4-7.
Haushofer, J. and Fehr, E. (2014). On the psychology of poverty. Science,
344(6186), 862-867.
Isaac, R. M., and Walker, J. M. (1988). Group size eﬀects in public goods
provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 179-199.
Isaac, R. M., and Walker, J. M. (1988). Communication and free-riding behavior: the voluntary contribution mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608.
Kandori, M. (1992). Social Norms and Community Enforcement, Review of
Economic Studies, 59(1), 63-80.
Kölle, F. (2015). Heterogeneity and cooperation: The role of capability and
valuation on public goods provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 109, 120-134.
Maier-Rigaud, F. P., Martinsson, P., and Staﬃero, G. (2010). Ostracism and
the provision of a public good: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 73(3), 387-395.
Nash, J. F., R. Nagel, A. Ockenfels, & R. Selten, 2012. The agencies method
for coalition formation in experimental games. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 109(50), 20358-20363.
Nikiforakis, N., Noussair, C.N., and Wilkening, T. 2012. Normative conﬂict
and feuds: the limits of self-enforcement. Journal of Public Economics, 96(910), 797-807.
Noussair, C., Plott, C. R., and Riezman, R. G. (1995). An Experimental
Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade. American Economic
Review 85(3), 462-491.
44

Ossa. R. 2015. Why trade matters after all? Journal of International Economics 97(2), 266-277
Rabin, M. 1993. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.
American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.
Reuben, E., and Riedl, A. 2013. Enforcement of Contribution norms in public
good games with heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 122-137.
Rodrik, D. (2000). How far will international economic integration go? Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14 (1), 177-186.
Rodrik, D. (2018). What Do Trade Agreements Really Do? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32 (2), 73-90.
Rossi-Hansberg E. (2017). 200 Years of Ricardian Theory: The Missing Dynamics. In: Jones, R. W., and Weder, R. (Eds.), 200 Years of Ricardian
Trade Theory, 197-205, Cham: Springer.
Reuben, E. and A. Riedl. 2009. Public goods provision and sanctioning in
privileged groups. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 53, 72-93.
Reuben, E., and Riedl, A. 2013. Enforcement of Contribution norms in public
good games with heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 122-137.
Sadrieh, A., and H.A. Verbon. 2006. Inequality, cooperation, and growth: an
experimental study. European Economic Review 50, 1197-1222.
Sampson, T. (2017) Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(4), 163-184.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2020). Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy, New York:
W.W. Norton & Company (in Collaboration with Carter Dougherty and the
Foundation For European Progressive Studies).
Stolper, W. F., and Samuelson, P. A. (1941). Protection and real wages. The
Review of Economic Studies, 9(1), 58-73.
Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., and Löschel, A. (2011). Inequality,
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A
A.1

Appendix
Proof of proposition 1

Here we prove that full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in every economy and treatment. We say that a norm of cooperation is being followed in
the group whenever all players adopt the trigger strategy discussed in Section
4. For clarity, let the defection payoﬀs be, respectively, d = 6 and d − l = 3 to
a producer and a consumer. Let ki := 9 + 2i + y denote the cooperation payoﬀ
to a consumer of type i = 1, 2, 3, with y = 0, ai in a ﬁxed pair and mixed
group, respectively. Here, the gain from integration a explicitly depends on
the type of player, as it happens in some treatments. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for full cooperation to be an equilibrium is reported in the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Fix an economy. Let k denote the smallest cooperation payoﬀ in
that economy. If the continuation probability
β ≥ β ∗ :=

d
∈ (0, 1),
k−d+l

then full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium.
Study the payoﬀ to a type i player. Under full cooperation, she earns ki
every other round as a consumer (zero, as a producer). Let s = 0, 1 denote the
role of the player at the start of a round, where 0=producer and 1=consumer.
The type of counterpart does not aﬀect the player’s payoﬀ—only their action
as a producer. The equilibrium payoﬀ is
v0 :=

βki
1 − β2

and

v1 :=

ki
.
1 − β2

To understand v0 note that in equilibrium every player always cooperates as
a producer. Hence, a player of type i who is a producer earns 0 in the current
period, and ki next period (as a consumer), a value discounted by β. As this
two-period cycle is indeﬁnitely repeated, we obtain v0 . The explanation is
similar for v1 .
Oﬀ-equilibrium there is full defection so the payoﬀ corresponds to the one
associated to inﬁnite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium, denoted
v̂0 :=

d + β(d − l)
1 − β2

and
47

v̂1 :=

d − l + βd
.
1 − β2

Full defection payoﬀs do not depend on the type i, unlike equilibrium payoﬀs.
It is immediate that oﬀ-equilibrium a producer has no incentive to deviate from
following the sanctioning rule (always defect), because defecting is the unique
best response to every other producer defecting in every round. Hence, we only
need to show that v0 ≥ v̂0 , i.e., in equilibrium the player has no incentive to
defect as a producer, by refusing to help some consumer.22 This inequality can
be rearranged as β ≥ βi∗ = 6/(6 + 2i + y) for the case of ﬁxed pairs and mixed
groups, and the Lemma automatically follows. Note that βi∗ < 1 because
ki − (2d − l) > 0 by assumption for all player types in all economies. The
Lemma exploits the fact that the lowerbound probability β consistent with
cooperation is a decreasing function of the player’s return from cooperation
ki . Hence βi∗ decreases in i; players of “higher” type have higher returns from
cooperation, hence a greater economic incentive to cooperate; see Table A1.
Proposition 1 follows from observing that in the experiment β = 0.75 and the
most stringent requirement for existence of equilibrium comes from ﬁxed pairs
composed of type 1 players, in which case y = 0 and ki = 11; here, β1∗ = 0.75,
which is the smallest lowerbound threshold.
Table A1: Threshold continuation probability β ∗ .
Isolated econ.
Treatment i =1
Neutral
.75
Converge .75
Diverge
.75
Neutral+ .75

22

2
.60
.60
.60
.60

3
.50
.50
.50
.50

Integrated econ.
i =1
.55
.46
.67
.46

2
.46
.46
.46
.40

3
.40
.46
.35
.35

Though in the experiment discounting starts on round T = 18, the round in which the
random termination rule started, one can demonstrates that the incentives to cooperate
monotonically decline until round t. It follows that by studying the incentives to cooperate in equilibrium using payoﬀs associated with the beginning of round T ensures those
incentives are satisﬁed in all t < T . In round t = T payoﬀs correspond to vs above. The
details of this demonstration are provided in Bigoni et al. (2019).
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